We consider a project selection problem where each project has an uncertain return with partially characterized probability distribution. The decision maker selects a feasible subset of projects so that the risk of the portfolio return not meeting a specified target is minimized. To model and evaluate this risk, we propose and justify a general performance measure, the Underperformance Riskiness Index (URI). We define a special case of the URI, the Entropic Underperformance Riskiness Index (EURI), for the project selection problem. We minimize the EURI of the project portfolio, which is the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion (ARA) of an ambiguity averse individual with constant ARA who is indi↵erent between the target return with certainty and the uncertain portfolio return. The EURI extends the riskiness index of Aumann and Serrano (2008) by incorporating the target and distributional ambiguity, and controls the underperformance probability for any target level. Our model includes correlation and interaction e↵ects such as synergies.
Introduction
One-fifth of the world's economic activity, or $12 trillion annually, is organized as a project (Project Management Institute 2013). In the numerous organizations that own and manage projects, a problem of central importance is selecting which of the organization's available projects to accept and run. This decision is typically made either by a Project Management O ce, or by a project selection committee composed of senior managers with experience as project managers. Both statistical and anecdotal evidence suggests that doing the right projects is a big factor in doing projects 2 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!) right (Cooper et al. 2000) . Indeed, well chosen projects are typically relatively easy to manage. Whereas, poorly selected projects are often dysfunctional and may compromise other projects by absorbing their resources. Baker and Freeland (1975) provide an early review of the project selection literature. Chien (2002) provides an updated review and observes that most of the literature considers project selection decisions that are made sequentially, i.e., one project at a time (iSixSigma.com 2010) .
He emphasizes that this approach does not generate optimal project portfolios. Heidenberger and Stummer (2003) also review the project selection literature, focusing on applications of operations research models.
We briefly review the literature of sequential project selection. In many organizations, available projects are initially screened according to various criteria such as their payback period and risk characteristics. Those projects that pass the initial screening are subjected to a more detailed scoring and/or ranking analysis. Nelson (1986) provides a scoring model for selecting flexible manufacturing system projects. Lu et al. (1999) study sequential project evaluation for dynamically arriving projects. Henriksen and Traynor (2002) describe a scoring model for selecting research and development projects. Meade and Presley (2002) describe a multifactor ranking process that takes into account an organization's strategic objectives and culture. Poh et al. (2002) provide a comparison of project selection methods that use the analytic hierarchy process. All these works use sequential project selection.
However, a project portfolio optimization approach that simultaneously makes accept or reject decisions for all the available projects o↵ers several significant advantages over sequential project selection (Chien 2002 , Kooragamage 2010 . First, it more accurately models overall project portfolio issues, such as risk. Second, it more e↵ectively utilizes the available resources. Third, it enables the modeling of correlation between uncertain project returns. Fourth, where there are interaction e↵ects such as synergies between the projects, they can also be modeled e↵ectively. Finally, the project portfolio approach enables optimization of an overall objective for project selection. For these reasons, our work considers project selection as a portfolio optimization problem. A basic mathematical model that supports binary project selection decisions is the deterministic zero one knapsack problem (Kellerer et al. 2004 ) and its extensions. Hall et al. (1992) develop a zero one knapsack model with additional constraints, and apply it to project funding decisions at the National Cancer Institute. Generalizations of the knapsack model (Fox et al. 1984 , Dickinson et al. 2001 ) model interaction e↵ects that are limited to those arising from synergistic returns between pairs of projects. Keisler (2005) identifies synergies among larger groups of projects. All these works consider the project selection problem as having known, deterministic returns and other data.
The second issue is the objective function, which maps the uncertain return to a decision criterion. Ideally, the objective function should be computable in polynomial time. Unfortunately, even in the absence of ambiguity, determining the distribution of the total portfolio return, which involves the evaluation of a weighted sum of random factors, is a computationally intractable problem (Khachiyan 1989, Nemirovski and Shapiro 2006) . Moreover, the intractability issue may be exacerbated by the presence of distributional ambiguity, where the evaluation of the objective function may require optimization over the distributional uncertainty set. A tractability requirement disqualifies widely used criteria such as many coherent and convex risk measures (Artzner et al. 1999, Föllmer and Schied 2004) , including the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) measure of Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) and the optimized certainty equivalent (OCE) of Ben-Tal and Teboulle (2007) . Similar concerns disqualify expected utility under general utility functions, and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) . The only utility function that we can tractably evaluate is the exponential utility function. However, a problem with this approach is how to elicit the risk aversion parameter of the decision maker, since this may be di cult to specify objectively. Moreover, behavioral paradoxes, such as those of Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961) , suggest weaknesses of the expected utility paradigm in predicting human preferences under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) .
Worst-case expected return is appealing due to its intuitiveness and tractability; however, while it considers ambiguity aversion, it ignores risk aversion. See Knight (1921) and Hsu et al. (2005) for the distinction between risk and ambiguity. Mean-variance approaches, including Markowitz's (1959) and Roy's safety-first (1952) , are computable but contradict the principle of monotonicity.
That is, a portfolio with returns that outperform those in another portfolio in all scenarios may be ranked as inferior. Hence, these approaches are also unsuitable. We present a closely related approach that resolves these issues.
Our selection criterion is related to the concept of target-based choice (Simon 1955) , which argues that the main goal of most firms is not maximizing return but rather attaining a target return. Several descriptive studies of the risk behaviors of real world managers (Lanzillotti 1958 , Mao 1970 , Payne et al. 1980 , 1981 confirm that aspiration levels drive decision making. Hence, we allow the decision maker to stipulate a desired aspiration level or target return. We propose a general performance measure, the Underperformance Riskiness Index (URI), to evaluate the risk. 5 We further define a special case, the Entropic Underperformance Riskiness Index (EURI), for the project selection problem. The EURI is the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion (ARA) 1 of an ambiguity averse individual with constant ARA who is indi↵erent between the target return with certainty and the uncertain portfolio return. It extends the riskiness index of Aumann and Serrano (2008) by incorporating the target and distributional ambiguity, and controls the underperformance probability for any target level. Intuitively, by minimizing the EURI, our model identifies the least risky project portfolio that meets the given target.
We briefly summarize our contributions to the literature, as follows. 1. We model both interactions and correlation among project returns, which are distinct and important issues in the project selection problem. We introduce the concept of a "project bundle" to formulate project interactions, and suggest a linear factor-based model to model correlation.
2. We describe uncertainties using a general distributional uncertainty set. This set contains conic constraints and hence can incorporate moment and Kullback-Leibler divergence information (Kullback and Leibler 1951) .
3. We propose a new performance measure, the URI. This enables us to consider the target return, which is an important factor in real decision making. 4. We provide a Benders decomposition algorithm to derive exact solutions e ciently. When there is only a single constraint for budget, we describe a greedy heuristic by which decision makers can easily find a close to optimal solution. 5. Our computational studies show that the projects selected by minimizing the underperformance risk are more than competitive in achieving the target with those found by several classical benchmark approaches, and are also more robust in performance. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the problem, describes the interaction and uncertainty structure, and presents our model. Section 3 introduces the URI, and justifies using the EURI for the project selection problem. Section 4 describes an overall solution procedure. Section 5 contains a discussion of the solvability of the problem, and a simple heuristic for the special case with a single budget constraint. In Section 6, we compare the performance of the solutions from Sections 4 and 5 against several classical benchmarks. Finally, Section 7 provides a conclusion, some comments about implementability issues, and suggestions for future research. Proofs appear in an Appendix. 
Model Formulation
In Section 2.1, we provide our notation and define the project selection problem. Section 2.2 describes the modeling of interaction e↵ects, uncertainty and correlation. Section 2.3 describes how we model distributional ambiguity.
Notation and problem definition
Consider a set N = {1, . . . , N} of available projects. All projects are initially available. We use "˜" to denote uncertain quantities, for exampler n denotes the uncertain return of project n. Let y n = 1 if project n is selected, and y n = 0 otherwise. We use boldface notation for matrices and vectors, e.g. y = (y 1 , . . . , y N ). We denote the total uncertain return of the selected projects by⇡(y). The problem faced by the decision maker is
Objective (1) maximizes the total uncertain return. Constraints (2) require that the selection of projects meets various deterministic restrictions, where A is a constraint matrix and b is a vector of resources. Constraint (3) ensures that each project is either accepted in full, or rejected. We let Y = {y : Ay  b, y 2 {0, 1} N }. If there are no interactions between the returns of projects, then the total uncertain return of the selected projects is⇡(y) = P N n=1r n y n . The next section relaxes this assumption.
Interactions, uncertainty and correlation
Interactions among projects are common in practice. When several projects are implemented together, the total return can be greater or smaller than the sum of those projects' individual returns. For example, the implementation of two IT projects may create additional value through integration (Cho 2010) . Alternatively, two new product development projects that generate similar products in a small consumer market may compromise each other's profitability (Huber et al. 1982 ). Yet, in the project selection literature, few papers adequately address this phenomenon. This is apparently due to the complexity that is introduced by modeling it. One approach (Fox et al. 1984 ) is to use the cross product of the binary decision variables. However, this formulation defines a nonlinear combinatorial optimization problem with limited solvability, and moreover returns for interactions among more than two projects are not considered. 7 We consider interactions among the uncertain returns of a subset of projects with any cardinality.
We define a project bundle ✓ N to consist of any number of projects that may have an interaction e↵ect. By project screening, the project selection committee can identify all important interaction e↵ects among projects. LetÊ denote the basic set which contains all bundles identified by the project selection committee as having significant interactions. In practice, the information available to the committee may be incomplete. For this reason, the return of some project bundles, for example those containing two or more project bundles in the setÊ, may not be well defined. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 1 The project bundle set, E, is the minimum set with the following properties:
The first property establishes consistency with the simple case without interaction e↵ects. From the second property, the project bundle set E includes all the significant interactions identified by the project selection committee. The third property shows that, for any two nondisjoint project bundles in E, their union is a project bundle in E. This definition of project bundles generalizes earlier studies (Fox et al. 1984 , Dickinson et al. 2001 ) by considering interactions among more than two projects.
An example illustrates the project bundle set E. Consider three available projects, N = {1, 2, 3}.
The project selection committee identifies a synergistic e↵ect when projects 1 and 2 are both selected, and when projects 2 and 3 are both selected. It follows that the total uncertain return corresponding to selection y is given bỹ
wherer represents the uncertain return from selecting , and ( , y) is an indicator function for bundle from the selection y defined by ( , y) = ⇢ 1 , if y n = 1, for n 2 ; @ 0 2 E, 0 such that y n = 1, for n 2 0 ; 0 , otherwise.
Thus, if ( , y) = 1, project bundle is a maximal subset of N under selection y. In general, it is unrealistic for the project selection committee to identify interaction e↵ects among all subsets of projects. Instead, they typically focus on a small number of significant interactions. Hence, |E| Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!)
is not exponentially large in practice. Keisler (2005) describes the process used by managers to estimater .
Our model of uncertainty is defined by a state-space ⌦ and a -algebra F of events in ⌦.
Consistent with the above discussion of the sources of uncertainty, we assume that the uncertain return of each project bundle is an a ne function of bounded, independently distributed factors
where the factor coe cients r 0 , . . . , r K are known. We thus describe the correlation e↵ect using a factor-based model instead of the typical covariance matrix. Our reasons for doing so are (a) estimating the covariance matrix from real data is di cult in general, especially for new or unique projects, (b) the linear factor-based model is motivated by practice since the performance of different project bundles depends on common factors in many cases, and (c) the linear factor-based model preserves the linear model structure and hence reduces the complexity of the solution process. In situations where historical data for similar projects is available, various statistical tools such as principal component analysis and linear regression can be used to calibrate the factors from the data. Even for a unique project, the factor-based model makes estimating the returns easier. Nevertheless, the linear factor-based model has limitations. It does not model nonlinearity, and the coe cients of the return-factor matrix are deterministic. This compromise is needed for tractability.
The returns of two selected projects are correlated if they have one or more factors with nonzero factor coe cients in common. The total uncertain return from project selection y is
Besides, we denote by V the space spanned by all possible project returns,ṽ : ⌦ ! <, as follows
.
Remark 1 We clarify the di↵erence between correlation and interaction. For example, consider three available projects A, B, and C. Their returns depend on two uncertain factorsz 1 ,z 2 byr A = r B =z 1 ,r C =z 2 . The interaction e↵ect exists only between A and C such that r AC = 3(z 1 +z 2 ). Thus, A and B are correlated, since they depend on the same uncertain factorz 1 , but have no interactions, i.e.,r AB =r A +r B = 2z 1 ; whereas, A and C have interactions, i.e., r AC 6 =r A +r C , but are uncorrelated; and B and C are neither correlated nor do they have any interactions. Supposẽ z 1 can be either 10 or 20 with equal probability,z 2 is always 0, and we need to choose two out of 9 the three projects. Given the interaction e↵ect, it is optimal to choose A and C. Nevertheless, if we fail to consider the interaction e↵ect in the model, we would select A and B, which is obviously not optimal.
Modeling risk and ambiguity
Since projects possess aspects of uniqueness (Project Management Institute 2004), there is frequently a lack of historical information about the probability distributions of their returns. Even with the availability of historical records, it is not always possible to determine exact distributions.
Therefore, we do not assume knowledge of the exact probability distribution on F. Instead, we allow ambiguity and assume that the true distribution, P, lies in a distributional uncertainty set denoted by P.
Specifically, using the independence property of the uncertain factors, we define our distributional uncertainty set as P = P 1 ⇥ · · · ⇥ P K , where
is the set of all possible probability distributions for the uncertain factorz k . In the definition (4), z kl , l = 1, . . . , L k are all possible realizations of the uncertain factorz k , g k is a mapping from < ! < M k , and C k is a convex set defined as
where K k is a regular cone, i.e., a closed, convex, and pointed cone with nonempty interior.
The first restriction of our distributional uncertainty set defined in Equation (4) is motivated by scenario building, an approach that is commonly used in practice to analyze project payo↵s (Ho↵man 1993) . For robust optimization, a similar concept has also been employed by Thiele (2008) and Ben-Tal et al. (2013) . In particular, z kl , l = 1, . . . , L k , represents the realization of the uncertain factor at each potential scenario. The second restriction in Equation (4) specifies the probability distribution by constraining the general estimation, g k (z k ), which may include any descriptive statistics such as mean, variance, within a confidence set, C k . The confidence set is defined via an auxiliary vector h. This vector allows us to model a rich variety of distributional information ofz k in a unified manner. Under the independence assumption, di↵erent uncertain factors are allowed to have di↵erent sample sizes and uncertainty sets. We provide two examples that can be described by our distributional uncertainty set as follows. For notational simplicity, we suppress the subscript k.
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for q = 1, . . . , Q, and m q is a positive integer representing its moment. We consider the following instance of g and C in the distributional uncertainty set (4),
This allows us to characterize the random variables with any moment information.
P L l=1 q l = 1, and an uncertainty level ⌫ 2 < + , where p l = P (z = z l ) , l = 1, . . . , L. This information can be represented by the uncertainty set P. We let g(z) = (g 1 (z), . . . , g L (z)) and, for all l = 1, . . . , L,
)
Although the constraints p l exp( h l /p l )  q l are not second order cone representable, we can use second order cone constraints to approximate these constraints to any given level of computational precision. See Chen and Sim (2009) .
Underperformance Riskiness Index
In this section, we specify an objective function for the project selection problem to evaluate the preference for project portfolio returns,⇡(y), under our model of uncertainty.
In order to incorporate the e↵ect of a target, which is an influential factor in decision making (Lanzillotti 1958 , Mao 1970 , Payne et al. 1980 , 1981 , we evaluate a project portfolio return by its target premium, i.e., the return minus target. Specifically, given a target return ⌧ , we define W = {w :w =ṽ ⌧,ṽ 2 V} as the set of all possible target premiums. Hence, the target premium w with P(w 0) = 1 implies that the target return can be achieved almost surely. By optimizing over the risk of target premiums, we find a project portfolio whose uncertain return has lowest risk with respect to the target ⌧ .
Before introducing our approach to quantify the risk of target premium, we first review the concept of a coherent risk measure, which is widely used for evaluating risk (Artzner et al. 1999, Föllmer and Schield 2004 
4. Positive Homogeneity: ( w) = (w), for all > 0.
While coherent risk measures have been widely applied (see, for example, Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000, Choi and Ruszczynski 2011) , they ignore the e↵ect of the target. To demonstrate this, we consider any two uncertain returns,ṽ,ṽ o 2 V. The di↵erence between the coherent risk measure of
which is independent of the target ⌧ . Therefore, if we are rankingṽ andṽ o by the coherent risk measure of their target premiums, the target has no influence. From Equation (5), we observe that this independence of the target is due to the use of cash invariance, which enables the coherent risk measure to separate the target from the target premium. To resolve this issue, we replace the property of Cash Invariance by a target-sensitive property, and define the Underperformance Riskiness Index as follows.
Definition 3 A function ⇢ : W ! [0, 1] is an Underperformance Riskiness Index (URI) if for all w,w o 2 W, it satisfies the following properties:
Satisficing:
(a) Attainment Content: ifw 0, then ⇢(w) = 0;
(b) Starvation Aversion: ifw < 0, then ⇢(w) = 1.
Convexity
In Definition 3, the Satisficing property is specific to the target-based criterion. The first part, Attainment Content, implies that if an uncertain return can almost surely achieve the target, then it has zero URI. The second part, Starvation Aversion, implies that the URI is absolutely intolerant to any uncertain return where the target cannot be attained almost surely.
We now justify the new URI risk measure by relating it to previously discussed risk measures.
First, we consider the classical convex risk measure. 
where we define inf ; = 1 by convention and is a normalized convex risk measure, i.e., it satisfies the properties of Monotonicity, Cash Invariance, Convexity, and has (0) = 0. Conversely, given a URI ⇢, the underlying normalized convex risk measure is given by
To understand the insight of the dual representation (6), we need the following result.
Proposition 1 Given any target premiumw 2 W and a convex risk measure normalized by
We observe that for any given target premiumw and a positive scale factor ↵, ↵w is acceptable, i.e., (↵w)  0, only when the scalar factor is no more than a benchmark value ↵ ⇤ . From Theorem 1, the URI can be interpreted as the reciprocal of this benchmark value. A small value of the URI is appealing since it corresponds to a high value of the benchmark ↵ ⇤ , which implies that the target premium remains acceptable for a large set of multiplicative perturbations.
Next, we establish a connection between the URI and the classical expected utility criterion.
To do so, we consider the URI whose underlying convex risk measure is the shortfall risk measure (Föllmer and Schied, 2002) . Under distributional ambiguity, we redefine it as follows.
Definition 4 A shortfall risk measure is any function U : W ! < defined by
where u : < ! < is an increasing concave di↵erentiable function normalized by u(0) = 0 and u 0 (0) = 1. Correspondingly, through the dual representation in Theorem 1, we define the utility-based URI,
, as one constructed based on a shortfall risk measure as follows:
We can interpret the shortfall risk measure, U (w), as the minimum cash amount, ⌘, that needs to be added to the target premiumw such that the overall expected utility exceeds zero. This can be shown to be a convex risk measure. Correspondingly, the utility-based URI is the reciprocal of the largest positive scalar factor ↵ such that the expected utility of ↵w remains positive.
Remark 2 Given known distributions, when we use exponential utility, i.e., u(x) = 1 exp( x), the URI coincides with the riskiness index of Aumann and Serrano (2008) ; whenw 0 8w 2 W and we use log utility, i.e., u(x) = log(1 + x), the corresponding URI is the operational measure of riskiness of Foster and Hart (2009) . Finally, the URI falls within the framework of coherent satisficing measures of Brown and Sim (2009) .
The project selection problem under the utility-based URI can be written as
As we discuss in Section 1, the only utility function that can be tractably evaluated for the summation of independently distributed random variables is the exponential function. This exponential utility function is of special interest since it is associated with a constant ARA, the value of which is ↵ and insensitive to the payo↵ x. This specific form of utility allows us to develop a tractable model and provide a computationally e cient solution procedure. Hence, we define the Entropic Underperformance Riskiness Index as follows.
Definition 5 Given a target premiumw 2 W, the Entropic Underperformance Riskiness Index
◆ .
Function C ↵ (w) is the certainty equivalent of the uncertain target premiumw under the worstcase exponential utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) with ARA parameter ↵. Hence, the EURI is the reciprocal of the highest ARA for which the certainty equivalent of target premiumw under ambiguity aversion equals 0. This index extends the riskiness index of Aumann and Serrano (2008) to incorporate the target and distributional ambiguity. We now present some useful properties of
Given this exponential utility function, besides the properties introduced in Definition 3, ⇢ E (w) also provides an envelope for the underperformance probability.
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!) Proposition 2 Given any target premiumw 2 W, the value of ⇢ ⇤ = ⇢ E (w) defines an envelope for the underperformance probability as
This proposition explains how the EURI relates to the underperformance probability. The EURI controls the underperformance probability for any target level. This also shows that, unlike the underperformance probability approach, the EURI is sensitive to the extent of violation of the target level.
From now on, we focus on the project selection problem under the EURI
Since the target ⌧ is exogenous in our model, setting its value is an important issue in practice, but one that has not been widely studied. Simon (1955) provides an example of selling a house,
where the agents target level is determined from learning about the housing market. Similarly, the project selection committee can determine a range for the target from an understanding of the investment climate specific to the industry. For further specification within this range, a field study by Merchant and Manzoni (1989) shows that targets are typically set at a level that can be achieved with 80% to 90% probability. Normative research focuses mainly on the motivational e↵ects of target setting on employee performance (Locke and Latham 2002) . Since this issue is beyond the scope of our work, we assume that the target ⌧ is given. However, to ensure that the model is meaningful, we assume that the target is reasonably set, such that the target is neither unachievable in expectation nor achievable almost surely. We formalize these assumptions as follows.
Assumption 1 There exists a feasible project selection y 2 Y such that the expected return of the projects under ambiguity aversion exceeds the target, i.e. inf P2P E P (⇡ (y)) > ⌧.
Assumption 2 There does not exist a feasible project selection y 2 Y such that the total uncertain return of the selected projects can achieve the target almost surely, i.e.⇡ (y) ⌧ .
From Assumption 1, we can guarantee that there exists a feasible solution y 2 Y, such that
From Assumption 2, since no solution can achieve the target almost surely, we have ⇢ ⇤ > 0.
We exclude project portfolio selections whose URI is infinite, and definê
It is easy to show thatŶ is nonempty, and for all y 2Ŷ, ⇢ E (⇡ (y) ⌧ ) 2 (0, 1),
Solution procedure
In this section, we describe a procedure to solve Problem (8). Our first result linearizes the indicator function, ( , y).
where x is the unique binary solution to the equation system
Lemma 1 implies that the total return can be written as a linear function of uncertain factors.
where x is determined from y according to Lemma 1, and we letz 0 = 1 for simplicity. Hence, Problem (8) can be reformulated as
where we define X = 8 > > > > > > > < > > > > > > > :
x :
and
The last equality follows from Remark 3. Note that in the definition of X , since the feasible
x is integer, there must exist a small positive scalar ✏ such that we can replace the constraint
Since x is a vector of binary decision variables, and U E (x) is nonlinear in x, we cannot solve the problem directly. Next, we transform U E (x) into a piecewise linear function, and use Benders decomposition to solve Problem (10). Proposition 3 For all x 2 X ,
Observe that the transformation of U E (x) into a piecewise linear function in Proposition 3 uses all the points ✓ 2 X , and hence is exact. We evaluate U E (✓) and D E (✓) by computing the worst-case distribution P k , k = 1, . . . , K, with the following result.
Proposition 4 Given any ✓ 2 X, 2 (0, 1), and k = 1, . . . , K, the distribution P k 2
This is a conic optimization problem that can be solved via commercial solvers. Using Proposition 4, we evaluate the worst-case distribution, and find ✓ = U E (✓) using a binary search method, as justified by Proposition 1. Based on the value of ✓ , we use Proposition 4 again to find D E (✓). Now, Problem (10) can be formulated as the mixed integer program min
Nevertheless, the size of X is large since it contains all feasible selections, hence the existence of an e cient algorithm for searching it is unlikely. This justifies the following enumerative procedure.
Algorithm BD 1. Start with any nonempty subset X o ⇢ X .
2. Solve the following subproblem min
and denote the solution by x ⇤ , and t ⇤ .
3. If t ⇤ = U E (x ⇤ ), then output the optimal value and optimal solution x ⇤ , and stop; otherwise, add x ⇤ into X o , and go to Step 2.
Proposition 5 Algorithm BD finds an optimal solution to Problem (11) in a finite number of steps.
Under the EURI, due to the separability of independent uncertainties described in Remark 3, we calculate the worst-case distribution for di↵erent uncertain factors independently, and hence significantly reduce the dimension of the optimization problem.
Solvability, and Heuristic for a Special Case
In this section, we investigate the computational solvability of several versions of the problem and provide a heuristic for solving the special case with only a single budget constraint. Given the definition of the EURI and the independence property of the worst-case certainty equivalent from Remark 3, the project selection problem can be formulated as follows.
x 2 X , ↵ > 0.
Observe that function C ↵ (·) is monotonic in ↵, hence we can perform a binary search for ↵. For any given ↵ > 0, we only need to solve the subproblem as follows.
Solvability
In this section, we consider the subproblem (13) and discuss its computational complexity.
Remark 4 In some cases, the structure of the constraint matrix Ay  b implies intractability, even for a deterministic version of the project selection problem. For example, under a simple knapsack constraint, the recognition version of the deterministic problem is binary NP-complete (Garey and Johnson 1979) . Further, under arbitrary resource constraints, the recognition version of the deterministic problem is unary NP-complete. We therefore focus on solvability results that derive from the uncertainty and interaction structure of the problem.
Independent returns without interactions
Proposition 6 If there are no interactions among the projects, and their returns are independent, then the objective function in Problem (13) is a linear function of y.
Proposition 6 shows that, without interactions and with independent uncertain returns, Problem (13) retains the solvability of the problem max P k2N a k y k = b}, then Problem (13) is optimally solved in pseudopolynomial time (Kellerer et al. 2004) .
Corollary 1 For the special case where project returns are independent and no interactions exist, Problem (13) with a single budget constraint can be simplified to
Correlated returns without interactions
We assume the absence of interactions, in order to focus solely on the role of correlation. Hence, E = N . We have the following result.
Proposition 7 If there are no interactions among the projects, then the recognition version of Problem (13) with correlated returns under a uniform matroid is binary NP-complete.
Independent returns and interactions
Proposition 8 If there are interactions among the projects, then the recognition version of Problem (13) with deterministic returns under a uniform matroid is unary NP-complete.
Heuristic EURI for a special case
In many situations, project selection is mainly constrained by a budget. In that case, the feasible project selection set is
Let e i represent an N dimensional vector, where the ith element is one, and the others are zero.
We describe a simple heuristic, which can be implemented on a spreadsheet, for Problem (13).
Heuristic EURI
Input: ARA parameter ↵.
Output: Heuristic solution y G ↵ , and its certainty equivalent C G ↵ . 1. Start with an empty selection, y = 0;
Set c = 0, to represent the total cost of the currently selected projects.
2. Let I = {i : i 2 N , y i = 0, c + c i  b}. If I = ;, then go to Step 5.
Find
4. If C ↵ (⇡(y + e j )) > C ↵ (⇡(y)), then select the jth project, set y = y + e j and c = c + c j , and go to Step 2; otherwise, go to Step 5.
5. Output y G ↵ = y and C G ↵ = C ↵ (⇡(y)), and stop. This heuristic is motivated by the greedy heuristic for the classical zero-one knapsack problem (Kellerer et al. 2004) . At each stage, we select the project that returns the largest ratio of increase in certainty equivalent to project cost. In the Appendix, we provide a simple example to illustrate the calculation procedure. Computational results for Heuristic EURI appear in Section 6.
Computational Studies
In Section 6.1, we describe several benchmark approaches from the project selection literature, and how to solve them. Section 6.2 contains a comparative study of the EURI and Heuristic EURI against the benchmark approaches. Section 6.3 provides a sensitivity analysis of the performance of the EURI. Finally, Section 6.4 studies the robustness of the EURI. All models are solved using CPLEX 11.0 on a computer with Intel I5 processor and 8GB RAM.
Benchmark selection approaches
In this set of experiments, we assume for both the EURI approaches and the benchmarks that the probability distributions of the factors are known. In Section 6.4, we show that this assumption does not significantly a↵ect the performance of the EURI approaches. We now describe several benchmark selection approaches for comparison with the EURI.
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!) 6.1.1. Expected return We consider maximizing expected return as the objective. Based on the formulation of total return in Equation (9), we need to solve the following problem.
Problem (14) is a deterministic problem, which is computationally easy to solve for large problems.
Underperformance probability
We consider the objective of minimizing the probability that the return will fall below a given target, ⌧ . This model is
However, optimization of this model is a highly intractable problem. We solve it using simulation. We generate a sample consisting of M independent random factor scenarios. Each scenario i contains a realization of independently generated random factors z i 1 , . . . , z i K . Given v 0 , . . . , v K , the problem of minimizing the underperformance probability is
where G is a su ciently large scalar such that 
where Var(·) is the variance of a random variable.
Let ⌃ denote the covariance matrix of the random factorsz 0 , . . . ,z K . By assumptionz k is independent ofz i , i 6 = k, hence ⌃ is a diagonal matrix with kth diagonal element ⌃ k,k = Var(z k ).
Therefore, Problem (16) is equivalent to
Problem (17) is a quadratic optimization problem with binary decision variables, which can be solved using CPLEX.
6.1.4. Maximization of Roy's safety-first ratio We consider maximization of Roy's safetyfirst ratio (1952) as the project selection criterion, and formulate the problem as
where (·) is the standard deviation of a random variable. In order to ensure that Roy's safety-first ratio optimization problem is well posed, we assume that the optimum Roy's safety-first ratio is positive and finite. Moreover, there does not exist a solution, x 2 X , such that E
Next, we propose a solution procedure to solve this nonconvex discrete optimization problem. We define
Proposition 9 The function, Z(s) is a continuous, nonincreasing function of s > 0. If Problem (18) is well posed, then (i) there exists an s > 0 such that Z(s) = 0, and (ii) the optimal solution of Problem (19) in which Z(s) = 0 is also optimal in Problem (18).
As the result of Proposition 9, we find the optimum solution of Roy's safety-first ratio problem by performing a binary search on s until Z(s) = 0. Subproblem (19) is a second order conic optimization problem with binary decision variables, which we solve to optimality using CPLEX.
Comparison with benchmarks
Using the guidelines of Hall and Posner (2001) , (a) we generate a wide range of parameter specifications, (b) the data generated is representative of real world scenarios, and (c) the experimental design varies only the parameters that may a↵ect the analysis. A project instance is specified by a Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!) set of projects, deterministic constraints, correlations, random factors, and interactions. We randomly generate 200 project instances with N = 50, and a single budget constraint which implies that no more than 25 projects can be selected.
We generate interactions by randomly assigning an index from UI(1, . . . , 100) to each project.
We specify that interaction e↵ectsr = ⌘ | | P i2 r i exist among projects with the same index. We let ⌘ 1 = 1, ⌘ 2 = 1.1, ⌘ 3 = 1.25, and ⌘ | | = 1.5 when | | 4. We consider 50 independent random factors, which follow two-point distributions with mean µ i and standard deviation i , given by µ i = 80 + (i 1) ⇥ 2.5 and i = 10 + (i 1) ⇥ 7.5, i = 1, . . . , 50. To consider skewness, the probability of a high return for random factor i is independently generated by p H i ⇠ U (0.55, 0.95). Given µ i , i , and p H i , the random factors are fully characterized. The total return of project i isr i = P K k=0 r k iz k . We let r i i = 1, which specifies that project i depends mainly on its local factor i, and generate r k i as U ( 0.5, 0.5), for k 6 = i, which specifies the correlation. Finally, let ' denote the ratio of the target to the maximum expected return, where ' 2 {0.6, 0.7, 0.8}.
For each project instance, we (a) find solutions using each selection approach, (b) randomly generate a sample of size 50,000 for the 50 random factors, and (c) compute the returns for each selection approach and each sample instance.
To provide a fair comparison between our two models and the four benchmark approaches, we first consider the four criteria that the benchmark approaches directly optimize. These criteria are expected return, underperformance probability, standard deviation, and Roy's safety-first ratio, respectively. We also consider four widely used performance criteria that are optimized neither by the benchmark approaches nor by the models we propose. The first is expected loss relative to the target. Second, normalizing by the probability of a loss, we consider the conditional expected loss.
Both these criteria are widely used in financial risk management (Embrechts et al. 1997 ). Finally, we consider the value at risk (VaR), i.e. the threshold loss that the project portfolio does not exceed with a specified probability, at both the 95% and 99% levels (Jorion 2006) . A negative value at risk represents the minimum profit that is attainable with the specified probability. Table 1 shows the mean performance of each project selection approach, for all eight criteria. Because of the slow convergence of Problem (15), the program for underperformance probability is terminated after 10 minutes for each instance. Hence, Problem (15) may not be solved to optimality. The average computation time to solve one instance under the EURI approach is about 8 seconds, compared to 0.04 seconds under the expected return maximization approach. However, the EURI time is still acceptable in practice, and much shorter than the Markowitz approach (350 seconds) or Roy's safety-first ratio approach (780 seconds). the EURI delivers much better expected loss and VaR than these two approaches. We conclude that our models are more than competitive with the benchmark approaches when compared across all the standard performance measures.
Sensitivity analysis
It is of interest to potential users of our selection models to know when their relative advantage in performance over the benchmark approaches is greatest. Compared to other selection approaches, the di↵erence with the EURI decreases with the target level. The reason for this is that as the target level increases, the project selections from the EURI, underperformance probability minimization, Markowitz model, and Roy's safety-first ratio maximization approaches become less risk averse.
Consequently, the subsets of projects chosen become more similar to those chosen by the risk neutral maximization of expected return approach. Hence, the di↵erences among the solutions from these models decrease.
The relative advantage of our models is also sensitive to the amount of interaction. We group the 200 project instances by the number of project bundles: low interaction (at most 62 bundles), medium interaction (from 63 through 66), and high interaction (at least 67). For each selection approach, Figure 1 shows the mean performance for each of the three groups, normalized by that of the EURI. For the VaR, we evaluate the performance using the maximum expected return as a reference point. The advantage of the EURI compared to Roy's safety-first ratio maximization approach, when measured by standard deviation, expected loss, conditional expected loss and VaR, increases with the density of interaction. Similar results apply to comparisons with the underperformance probability minimization approach. Therefore, our recommendation to use the EURI over the other two approaches is stronger in project selection environments with more interactions.
Motivated by the example in Remark 1, we conduct a small computational test to study the importance of considering interactions. Our data set consists of 200 feasible instances that require the selection of 10 out of 20 available projects. The target for each instance is set at 80% of the maximal expected profit. Our results show that in 38% of the instances, the target is not achievable even in expectation if we ignore the interactions among the projects.
Robustness
We study the robustness of our EURI model by comparing two EURI solutions. The first uses full information about the distribution, whereas the second uses only knowledge of the bounded support and mean. We consider the same 200 instances as in Section 6.2, except for the uncertain factors. Under full information, the 50 uncertain factors follow beta distributions with parameters ↵ i , i , i = 1, . . . , 50, which are generated as U (0.1, 0.9); under distributional ambiguity, we calculate the corresponding bound support [0, 1] and mean support ↵ i ↵ i + i for each uncertain factor. We set ' = 0.7. For each project instance, we (a) find EURI solutions from the two information sets, (b) randomly generate a sample of size 100,000 for the 50 random factors following the beta distribution described above, and (c) compute the returns for both solutions from each information set.
Among the 200 project instances, there are 119 instances where the distributional ambiguity solution is the same as the full information solution. Hence, we show average performance only over the remaining 81 instances, in Table 2 . The di↵erence in performance between the two solutions is less than 1.5%, except for the expected loss criterion where it is 3.6%. We therefore conclude that the performance of our models is highly robust against distributional ambiguity.
Concluding Remarks
This paper considers the problem of selecting projects when the return of each project is uncertain.
Our modeling approach is general enough to allow us to consider interactions between di↵erent projects, and correlations between their uncertain returns. We describe an Underperformance Riskiness Index for this problem. Our model minimizes a special case, the Entropic Underperformance Riskiness Index, which is the reciprocal of the ARA parameter, while keeping the certainty equivalent of the uncertain returns above a given target. The model is solved using a binary search on the ARA value of the project portfolio, with the solution of the subproblems by a Benders decomposition method. We demonstrate computationally that the EURI model identifies project portfolios which are more than competitive in achieving the target, compared to those found by classical approaches, including maximization of expected return, mean-variance analysis, minimization of underperformance probability, and Roy's safety-first ratio maximization. The EURI approach also provides robust performance in protecting against ambiguity in the data. For project selection problems that are constrained only by a budget, we describe a simple but highly accurate Heuristic EURI procedure.
The data requirements of our models are not excessive or unusual. We do not assume knowledge of a specific probability distribution for the factors that a↵ect project return; instead, we only assume knowledge of bounded support and mean for the factor values. Covariance information is implied by common factors between projects, which in practice should be identified as a risk issue during preliminary evaluation by the project selection committee. Even if covariance information is not fully available, the robust selection model can still be used, based on partial covariance information. Finally, interaction e↵ects between projects are routinely identified by the project selection committee during project definition.
Our results provide several insights that managers should find useful. First, it is now possible to design a EURI project portfolio that is least risky, subject to meeting a target certainty equivalent level. Second, this design can be achieved very accurately using a computationally e cient procedure. Third, the resulting project portfolios o↵er significant benefits over those obtained by the most widely used benchmark approaches from the literature. Fourth, it is possible to balance upside potential and downside risk accurately, by adjusting the target level. Finally, in project selection situations that are constrained only by a budget, a simple spreadsheet-based procedure routinely provides almost exact EURI project portfolios.
Several opportunities exist for future research. First, in many practical projects, the initial investment cost is not predictable, and uncertainty about it can be incorporated into a EURI model. Second, a related extension is allowing the available budget to be random. In practice, available budgets for funding projects are often uncertain (Koç et al. 2009 ). Third, the EURI model should be applied to dynamic project selection problems. In such problems, projects with random investment cost and return become available over time (Herbots et al. 2007) . Consequently, some part of the available budget may need to be held in reserve for future opportunities. Fourth, the problem considered here can be generalized to allow for decisions about the timing of projects, in order to match resource requirements and resource availability over time. A EURI approach can be applied to this problem. Finally, it would be valuable to perform large scale behavioral experiments on project selection, to determine the factors that influence how well the EURI explains those decisions in practice. We hope that our work will encourage future research in these interesting and practically important directions. First, we prove that if is a normalized convex risk measure, then ⇢(·), as defined by Equation (6), is a URI.
Monotonicity: This is straightforward to prove, since is monotonic.
Attainment Content: Ifw 0, we have ↵w 0 and hence (↵w)  (0) = 0 8↵ > 0. Then, from (6), we have ⇢(w) = 0.
Starvation Aversion: Ifw < 0, for any ↵ > 0, we have ↵w < 0 and hence 9✏ > 0 such that ↵w + ✏  0, (↵w) = (↵w + ✏) + ✏ ✏ > 0. Hence, from (6), we have ⇢(w) = 1.
where the first inequality follows from the convexity of , and the second inequality follows from the definition of S w and S w o . Hence, we have w + (1 ) w o 2 S . That is,
Therefore, from (6), we have
Positive Homogeneity: Observing that 8 > 0, we have
We now prove that, given a URI ⇢, the defined by Equation (7) is a normalized convex risk measure.
Monotonicity: This is straightforward to prove, since ⇢ is monotonic.
Cash Invariance: We observe that (w + ) = min {a : ⇢(w + + a)  1} = min {a : ⇢(w + a)  1} = (w) .
Convexity: We observe that
where the first inequality follows from the convexity of ⇢, and the second inequality follows from the fact that ⇢(w + (w))  1 and ⇢(w o + (w o ))  1 which result from Equation (7). Therefore, we have
Normalization: Since ⇢(a) is 0 if a 0 and 1 otherwise, we have (0) = min{a : ⇢(a)  1} = 0.
Finally, we prove that if is defined by Equation (7), then Equation (6) is true. Observe that
where the first equality follows from Equation (7), and the second and third equalities are due to the monotonicity and positive homogeneity of ⇢, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1
Choose any ↵ o 2 < such that (↵ ow )  0. For any ↵ 2 (0, ↵ o ], letting = ↵/↵ o 2 (0, 1], we have
where the first inequality follows from the convexity of , and the second inequality follows from (↵ ow )  0 and > 0. Therefore, we can choose ↵ ⇤ as the largest ↵ o with (↵ ow )  0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Based on the definition of ⇢ E (w), we have for any ✓ 0 and P 2 F,
The first inequality holds because of the Markov inequality, and the second inequality holds since
Proof of Lemma 1
Given y, we note that for all 2 E, x = 1 if and only if y i = 1, for all i 2 . Let G = { : ( , y) = 1}, hence P 2E r k ( , y) = P 2G r k . From the definition of x, we observe that, for all 2 E,
Therefore, for k = 0, . . . , K,
and from the definition of v k 0 , we have
r k ( , y).
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider any x, ✓ 2 X and let x = U E (x) and ✓ = U E (✓). We first prove that x , ✓ 2 (0, 1).
From the definition of X and Assumption 2, we know thatw 0 does not hold and inf P2P E P (w) > 0. When P is a singleton with P = {P}, Kaas et al. (2001) show that lim ↵#0 C ↵ (w) = E (w), and lim ↵#1 C ↵ (w) = w where w = sup{x 2 < | P(w x) = 1}.
We can easily generalize this result to the case where P is the general distributional uncertainty set defined in (4), and then we have lim ↵#0 C ↵ (w) = inf P2P E (w), and lim ↵#1 C ↵ (w) = w with w = sup{x 2 < | inf P2P P(w x) = 1}. Therefore, since inf P2P E (w) > 0, we have lim ↵#0 C ↵ (w) > 0.
In addition, sincew 0 does not hold, lim ↵!1 C ↵ (w) < 0. Due to the continuity and nonincreasing property of C ↵ (w) in ↵, there must exist a ↵ ⇤ 2 (0, 1) such that C ↵ (w) 0 i↵ ↵ 2 (0, ↵ ⇤ ]. Hence, 1) . Similarly, we also have ✓ 2 (0, 1).
Since the function C 1/ (x 0 v kz k ) is continuous in , based on the definition of U E (·), we know that
Further, given any P 2 P, we can easily check the concavity of the function ln E P (exp ( x 0 v kz k )) in x; hence, its perspective, ln E P [exp ( x 0 v kz k / )], is jointly concave in ( , x). We then have 0 =
where the first inequality follows from P k 2 arg sup P2P 
The equality holds only if ✓ 0 v kz k has no uncertainty under P k , which cannot be true for all k = 0, . . . , K, otherwise the total profit P K k=0 ✓ 0 v kz k would be deterministic which contradicts Assumption 2 and ✓ 2 X . Therefore, we have
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 5
When Algorithm BD terminates, it follows from Proposition 3 that
Hence, the optimal solution x ⇤ , t ⇤ of Problem (12) is feasible in Problem (11). Since Problem (12) is a relaxation of Problem (11), x ⇤ , t ⇤ is also optimal in Problem (11).
from Proposition 3 and the assumption that x ⇤ 2 X o . Therefore, X o increases. Note that X is a finite set. Hence, the algorithm terminates in a finite number of steps.
Proof of Proposition 6
In the case without interactions, the project bundle set is the same as the available project set, i.e., E = N , and for i 2 N , (i, y) = y i . For all i 2 N , let I i = {k : r k i 6 = 0, k = 1, . . . , K}, i.e.,r i = r 0 i + P k2I i r k iz k . Also, since the returns are independent, we have I i \ I j = ;, for i, j 2 N and i 6 = j. Then, from Remark 3,
where the last equality holds since y i 2 {0, 1}.
Proof of Proposition 7
By reduction from the following NP-complete problem (Garey and Johnson 1979) .
Equal Cardinality Partition: Given a finite set N of even cardinality N , with size c k 2 Z + for each k 2 N , determine if there exists a partition N 1 , N 2 of N such that |N 1 | = |N 2 | = N/2 and P k2N 1 c k = P k2N 2 c k . Under a uniform matroid, i.e., Y = {y 2 {0, 1} N : P k2N y k = m}, we construct an instance of Problem (13) with
Equation (20) defines a specific target ⌧ to achieve. Equation (21) defines a special type of uncertain return, where the return of each project is determined by a common uncertain factorz. We assume thatz is +1 or 1, with equal probability. Equation (22) implies that the only feasible solutions select exactly N/2 projects. In this instance,
We prove that there exists a selection for this instance such that the objective value is infinite, if and only if there exists a solution to Equal Cardinality Partition.
()) Suppose there exists a solution N 1 and N 2 to Equal Cardinality Partition such that P k2N 1 c k = P k2N 2 c k = ⌧ and |N 1 | = |N 2 | = N/2. Then we set y i = 1, i 2 N 1 , and y i = 0, i 2 N 2 . Thus, for ↵ > 0,
Therefore, the objective value of this instance is infinite.
(() Suppose there exists a project selection y ⇤ such that the objective value is infinite, i.e., C ↵ (⇡(y ⇤ )) ⌧ , for ↵ > 0. Since, the function exp( ↵x) is strictly convex in x for ↵ > 0, we have which implies that C ↵ (⇡(y ⇤ )) = ⌧ . Furthermore, equality holds if and only if P k2N c k y ⇤ k = P k2N c k (1 y ⇤ k ) = ⌧ . Hence, there exists a solution N 1 = {k : y ⇤ k = 1, k 2 N } and N 2 = N \ N 1 to Equal Cardinality Partition.
Proof of Proposition 8
By reduction from the following unary NP-complete problem (Garey and Johnson 1979) .
Maximum Clique: Given an undirected graph G = (V, E), with vertex set V , edge set E, and an integer m, does there exist a clique in G of total size at least m?
Under a uniform matroid, i.e., Y = {y 2 {0, 1} N : P k2N y k = m}, we construct an instance of Problem (13) where each project i corresponds to a vertex i 2 G, and has deterministic return 1. For any pair of selected projects (i, j) 2 N , no interaction e↵ect occurs if (i, j) 2 E, and an interaction e↵ect of -1 occurs if (i, j) 6 2 E. We show that this instance has a total return of at least m, if and only if the maximum clique problem has a solution.
()) Suppose there exists a maximum clique G 0 ⇢ G, where |G 0 | m. Then, in the project selection problem, we select the projects that correspond to exactly m vertices of G 0 . By construction, the matroid constraint is satisfied, hence this selection is feasible. Moreover, the total deterministic return of the selected projects is m.
(() Suppose there exists a feasible selection S ⇢ N of projects with total return at least m.
From feasibility, |S| = m. Since each project has deterministic return 1, and there are no positive interaction e↵ects, the total return must be exactly m. Hence, the interaction e↵ect among the selected projects must be 0. This implies that the set S corresponds to a solution to the maximum clique problem.
Proof of Proposition 9
Since the cardinality of the set X is finite and the values of E ⇣ P K k=0 x 0 v kz k ⌘ and ⇣ P K k=0 x 0 v kz k ⌘ for x 2 X are all finite, the function Z(s) is a continuous, nonincreasing function of s.
(i) Since the problem is well posed, Z(1) < 0. By assumption on ⌧ , Z(0) > 0. Therefore, there
exists an s such that Z(s) = 0.
(ii) Since the optimal Roy's safety-first ratio is positive and finite, we consider a subset of solutions 
Let x ⇤ denote an optimal solution x 2 X to Problem (19) in which Z(s) = 0. Since Problem (18) is well posed, s > 0 and Z(s) = 0, we must have x ⇤ 2X . Moreover, if x = x ⇤ , then the right inequality in (23) is also tight. Therefore, x ⇤ is an optimal solution to Problem (18).
An Example of Heuristic EURI
We use a simple example, which considers both interactions and correlation, to illustrate the steps of Heuristic EURI. Six projects are available with equal cost, to develop six products for three markets A, B and C. The project data appears in Table 3 . Because of the limited budget, no more than three projects can be selected overall. For each market, there are two available projects. Selecting both projects within the same market can lead to a positive interaction where their products are complements or a negative interaction where they are substitutes (Huber et al. 1982 ). Furthermore, the uncertain return of each project depends a nely on two random factors. The first factor, for example technical issues in the project, influences only the project itself. The second factor, for example the state of the economy, potentially influences all projects. We define the decision Each uncertain factor is independent of the others, and the value ofz i , i = 1, . . . , 7, is either z i or z i , as shown in Table 4 , with equal probability. zi 20 45 60 90 135 160 10 Table 4 Factor Returns in Heuristic EURI Example.
We set ↵ = 0.01 as a trial value. Table 5 shows the calculations of Heuristic EURI for the example.
Iteration Heuristic Steps
Calculations j 1 Initialization y = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), c = 0, C↵(⇡(y))=0 2 Feasible Projects I = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} Update y = (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0), c = 3, C↵(⇡(y)) = 53.92 Feasible Projects I = ;, stop.
Output
y G ↵ = y = (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0), C G ↵ = C↵(⇡(y)) = 53.92 Table 5 Example Calculations using Heuristic EURI.
For any given ↵ > 0, we use Heuristic EURI to solve the subproblem, and then apply a binary search to find the optimal value of ↵ in Problem (8). Thus, if ⌧  C G ↵ = C ↵ (⇡(y G ↵ )) = 53.92, the trial value of ↵ is increased; otherwise, it is decreased. For comparison, if ↵ = 0.01, then the optimal EURI solution is y ↵ = (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) and C ↵ = C ↵ (⇡(y ↵ )) = 54.44.
